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1. ABSTRACT!
This paper deals with the question of which factors have to be given for 
successful share repurchases that create long-term shareholder value. Center of 
the thesis is the agency theory and its influence on share repurchases. Based on 
theoretical findings success factors for share repurchases are derived and then 
verified by case studies.  
The main drivers for a successful share repurchase elaborated by this paper are a 
suitable long-term executive compensation, an independent board of directors and 
a shareholder structure without a majority shareholder. Additionally the findings 
show that tying repurchases to certain share price thresholds improves the quality 
of share repurchases. 
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5. INTRODUCTION,!OBJECTIVE!AND!SCOPE!OF!THE!PAPER!5.1. INTRODUCTION!
At present interesting things can be witnessed at the United States´ (U.S.) stock 
market. More and more low yielding cash is piling up on corporate balance 
sheets1, which cannot be profitably reinvested into the companies´ operations2. 
Especially, but not only, companies in the technology sector such as Apple and 
Microsoft generate earnings at a much higher pace, than they are able to reinvest 
in their businesses3. Apple as an example has accumulated USD 147 billion in 
cash and equivalents (e.g. marketable securities) by the end of September 2013. 
This amount may still increase going forward even though Apple is investing in 
its business on a large scale through capital expenditure and strategic 
acquisitions4.!
 
Since investors demand a return when providing capital to a company it is 
understandable that they don´t like to see too much of low yielding cash sitting on 
the balance sheet. Hence management and investors seek for possibilities to return 
those funds to the company owners, so they can find better, higher yielding 
investments for that cash. Companies listed on the stock market either choose to 
return cash to shareholders by paying out dividends or repurchasing their own 
stock5. This is why Apple, pushed by its investors, initiated a USD 100 billion 
program to return excess funds to shareholders until the end of 2015 by share 
repurchases and dividends6. Recently in April 2014 that program was accelerated 
by the commitment to return an additional USD 30 billion to shareholders by 
share repurchases to clear cash of the balance sheet. But not just Apple also many 
other companies have these kinds of payout programs in place7. 
Unlike with dividend payments where shareholders typically receive a cash 
payment, the profit from share repurchases is an appreciating share price8. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Schoenenberger, C. R., The Wallstreet Journal., Companies Continue to Hoard Cash (2013). 
2 Demos, T./ Russolillo, S./ Jarzemsky, M., The Wallstreet Journal., Firms Send Record Cash Back to 
Investors (2013). 
3 Harjani, A., US Corporate Cash (2013). 
4 Apple Inc., 10-K Annual Report 2013 (2013). 
5 Lahart, J., The Wallstreet Journal., Record Cash Piles (2010). 
6 Apple Inc., 10-K Annual Report 2013 (2013). 
7 Apple Press Info: Apple Expands Capital Return Program to Over $130 Billion (2014). 
8 Blieffert, C., Der Aktienrückkauf aus empirischer Sicht (2008). p. 4 
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However there are plenty of negative examples where companies repurchased 
shares and the stock price did not react at all or even continued to slide. Dell, the 
producer of personal computers, is such an example. Dell´s share price saw a 
decline ever since it announced the increase of its share repurchase program in 
early 20059. Back then Dell´s share price stood at over USD 40. Lately in 2013 
Dell was taken private for only $13.85 a share10. For shareholders and the 
company itself this buyback didn’t create any value at all. In fact the funds that 
were spent to acquire shares destroyed value since later those shares could have 
been purchased for just a fraction of what has been paid for them in 2005. 
 
In the year of 2013 shares valued at a total 
of USD 475,6 billion have been repurchased 
by the fortune 500 U.S. listed companies, 
which makes share repurchases the largest 
payout instrument, even superior to dividend 
payments 11 . Reviewing those buyback 
programs it became obvious that there are a 
lot of companies that have successfully 
increased shareholder value by repurchasing 
their own shares and other companies that 
have failed to do so. To figure out the 
reasons for those different outcomes, it is 
necessary to elaborate factors beneficial to 
successful share repurchases by analyzing companies that repurchased shares in 
the past. 
 5.2. OBJECTIVE!AND!METHODOLOGY!
This paper intends to provide an answer to the question of which factors have to 
be given to exercise a successful share repurchase that creates long-term 
shareholder value. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Dobbs, R./ Rehm, W., Mc Kinsey & Company Member Edition, The value of share buybacks (2005). 
10 De la Merced, M. J./ Hardy, Q., The New York Times, Battle for Dell (2013). 
11 Press Release: S&P 500 Stock Buybacks Up 19% in 2013 (2014). 
Figure 1: Payout Instruments Comparison 
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First the paper will give a descriptive explanation into the mechanics of share 
repurchases, then motivations for buying back stock will be elaborated and 
discussed. Hereby the focus will be put on the signaling and undervaluation 
hypothesis. These hypotheses are closely linked to agency theory and corporate 
governance, which connect executive compensation and monitoring with the share 
repurchase decision. 
Derived from the theoretical findings, factors for successful share buybacks will 
be formulated. Case studies of companies that have been active acquirers of their 
own shares will then be consulted to verify those success factors. 
In a conclusion these factors of success will be summarized and will serve as 
guidelines to judge on the eventual successfulness of future share repurchases 
from a shareholder´s point of view. 
 5.3. SCOPE!AND!BONDS!
The success factors of share buybacks analyzed in this paper are only focusing on 
the situation in the U.S. and on companies listed on U.S stock exchanges. 
Theories and drawn conclusions might not be applicable to countries outside the 
U.S., as legal frameworks for share repurchases may differ from country to 
country. 
Furthermore the success-factors are discussed based on a shareholder point of 
view.  
A successful buyback in this paper is defined as a buyback that creates long-term 
value for shareholders through an appreciating share price, thus investigating 
returns right after the announcement of share repurchases will not be subject to 
the analysis. Long-term in that case depicts a timeframe exceeding at least five 
years. Also share repurchases pursuing other goals like serving as an acquisition 
currency or protecting the company from hostile takeovers will not be covered 
within this paper. 
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6. MECHANICS!AND!ACCOUNTING!OF!SHARE!REPURCHASES!6.1. MECHANICS!OF!SHARE!REPURCHASES!
The following paragraph gives an explanation on how share buybacks of publicly 
traded companies actually function. There are basically three major and different 
ways for companies to repurchase their own shares, either through a repurchase 
on the open market, a tender offer respective Dutch auction tender offer,12 or the 
method of a negotiated repurchase.13 
 
The Open Market Repurchase is the most common way companies use to 
repurchase shares. Approximately 90% of all share buybacks at the U.S. stock 
market account for open market repurchases. 14  Companies performing this 
method are regularly acquiring their own shares on the stock market at current 
market price. Normally the amount that will be spent on the buyback and the 
period during which shares will be repurchased is communicated in advance. The 
expiration date and the amount of the program can be freely chosen but have to be 
disclosed according to the SEC.15 However, such a program is not binding. 
Should market conditions change unfavorably it can be terminated at any time. 
Furthermore this method typically proves to be less costly than tender offerings as 
no premium to market price has to be granted to shareholders. However an open 
market repurchase requires highly liquid markets. Otherwise a large buyback 
would strongly drive up the share price and the cost of the buyback would be 
unreasonably high, because the sudden high demand for shares meets the 
persisting low supply.16 
Over time other ways to buy back shares have established. The Fixed-Price 
Tender Offer, unlike open market repurchases, does not buy the shares at market 
price but offers all shareholders to sell their shares at a fixed price to the company. 
This method is benefiting large buybacks intending to repurchase a lot of shares in 
a very short period of time, as prices are not driven up through the unusual high 
demand in the stock. The company determines a fixed price at which shares can !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Copeland, T. E./ Weston, J. F./ Shastri, K., Finazierungstheorie und Unternehmenspolitik (2008). p. 849f 
13 Vermaelen, T., Foundations and Trends in Finance, Share Repurchases (2005). p. 7 
14 Blieffert, C., Der Aktienrückkauf aus empirischer Sicht (2008). p. 13 
15 Skadden, Corporate Finance Alert, Share Repurchases (2013). 
16 Blieffert, C., Der Aktienrückkauf aus empirischer Sicht (2008). p. 13ff 
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be tendered, a target number of shares that are offered to shareholders and an 
expiration date for the offer. All shareholders are free to accept or reject the 
offer.17 Such an offer usually contains a premium to the present market price as an 
incentive for shareholders to separate from their shares. The higher the premium 
the more shareholders are likely to accept the offer and vice versa. This premium 
is critical for the fulfillment of the Fixed-Price Tender Offer and should be set as 
low as possible in order to lower the cost of the buyback for the company, but just 
as high as necessary to buyback the intended amount of shares. In America from 
1984 to 1989 that premium averaged 11,9% on the market price of shares.18  
The Dutch Auction Tender Offer tries to avoid that specific problem of setting 
the correct premium as it limits itself to communicate the volume of shares to be 
bought back. Then the company announces a period for shareholders to submit a 
price, which they would sell their shares to the company for. The lowest price 
submitted that is able to fetch the entire targeted buyback volume is now offered 
to shareholders. Basically the difficulty of evaluating the premium is shifted from 
the company to the shareholder. Premiums paid in America from 1984 to 1989 
using the Dutch Auction Tender Offer averaged 7,7% of the market price.19 
 
Another way to repurchase shares is the Negotiated Repurchase, where the 
company is directly in talks with a major shareholder. Both parties negotiate on a 
fixed price to which shares are bought back. That price typically contains a 
premium to the current market price of the stock, too. Other shareholders are 
locked out of that transaction and cannot participate. In the US this is the less used 
method of repurchasing stock and almost solely applied to defend a company 
against takeover, which is not subject to this paper.20  
After the shares are bought back, they are either used as an acquisition currency 
(acquisitions of companies can not only be paid in cash but also by using own 
stock of the same value), held back for later reissuance on the market at an 
higher price, used for employee compensation or most of the time the shares are 
being retired, which is also the only type discussed in this paper.21 Retiring !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Vermaelen, T., Foundations and Trends in Finance, Share Repurchases (2005). p. 3-5 
18 Blieffert, C., Der Aktienrückkauf aus empirischer Sicht (2008). pp. 16-17 
19 Blieffert, C., Der Aktienrückkauf aus empirischer Sicht (2008). pp. 17-18 
20 Blieffert, C., Der Aktienrückkauf aus empirischer Sicht (2008). pp. 18-19 
21 Investopedia, What happens when a company buys back its shares? (2009). 
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shares reduces the total number of shares outstanding, as they cease to exist any 
longer. This leaves shareholders that did not sell their shares to the buyback 
program with a bigger ownership stake in the company, as holding the same 
number of shares now accounts for a larger percentage of the reduced overall 
share-count.22  
 6.2. ACCOUNTING!FOR!SHARE!REPURCHASES!
To understand the impact of share repurchases on companies it is necessary to 
cover the basic accounting of such. However this chapter only gives explanations 
on how accounting for repurchases in combination with the cancellation 
respectively retirement of shares works. There are various methods of accounting 
for repurchases, nevertheless only the cost-method will be covered as it is most 
straightforward and sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that acquired shares are cancelled and not reissued at a later date. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require recording share 
repurchases on the balance sheet. Companies mostly fund share repurchases using 
cash. Consequently the cash-position on the balance sheet´s asset side is reduced 
by the number of shares acquired times the price paid per acquired share. On the 
equity and liability side the acquisition of own shares impacts the item “treasury 
stock”. Treasury stock represents shares of the own company. It is non-voting 
stock and is not eligible for dividend payments. Basically it can be treated as 
unissued capital. As the name “cost method” suggests, treasury stock is accounted 
for on cost basis. It can be viewed as a contra account to equity. Hence, when 
shares are repurchased, treasury stock is debited with the amount of acquired 
shares valued at cost (or number of shares repurchased times price paid per 
acquired share). Share repurchases thus reduce a company´s equity base similar to 
a reduction of shareholder capital.23 
Figure 2 shows the liabilities and equity side of IBM´s 2013 balance sheet. IBM 
has been buying back shares for years, which resulted in a very large treasury 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2012 (2013). 
23Weil, R./ Schipper, K./ Francis, J., Financial Accounting (2012). p. 529 ff 
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stock account. By the end of fiscal year 2013 that number showed a balance of 
USD 137.242 million. IBM thereby reduced its equity base by the same amount.24 
 
!
Figure 2: IBM Treasury Stock, Annual Report 2013 
 
Important to consider is the fact that repurchased shares are not considered as an 
investment, such minority holdings in another company. Holdings in other 
companies alter in value along with the share price of the company that was 
invested in; however repurchased shares never change in value and are always 
remaining in the treasury stock account on cost basis.25 
 7. SHARE!REPURCHASES!VERSUS!DIVIDENDS!
A lot of companies are generating excess funds from their operations and can 
neither reinvest them profitably nor do they need that cash for other purposes such 
as paying down debt. Whenever companies find themselves in such situation they 
should think about returning those funds to shareholders. Typically this is done 
either by paying out dividends or repurchasing shares.26 
This chapter should give a brief overview on the differences of dividends and 
share repurchases and deals with the question whether or not these payout 
instruments are substitutable.  !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 IBM Corp., Annual Report 2013 (2014). 
25 Weil, R./ Schipper, K./ Francis, J., Financial Accounting (2012). p. 529 ff 
26 Lahart, J., The Wallstreet Journal., Record Cash Piles (2010). 
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7.1. THE!DIVIDEND!SUBSTITUTION!HYPOTHESIS!
As mentioned, companies distribute cash to shareholders by either paying 
dividends or repurchasing stock. Historically there has been an affinity of U.S. 
corporations towards paying dividends, because of the introduction of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. This regulation strongly prohibited any 
fraud in connection with buying and selling of securities. Therefore firms 
hesitated to repurchase stock on the open market in fear of harsh punishments and 
investigations because of market manipulation. Some 48 years later in 1982 the 
SEC released a regulation that gave corporations the go-ahead to legally 
repurchase shares.27 Therefore in the more recent years the trend to payout funds, 
reversed in favor of share repurchases. From 1999 onwards more money has been 
spent on buybacks than on dividends.28 The following gives an explanation on 
why share buybacks might be the more attractive payout instrument. Modigliani 
and Miller state in their dividend irrelevancy theory that dividends and buybacks 
are perfectly substitutable when all investors behave rationally and a perfect 
capital market is given. In a perfect capital market there is no information 
asymmetry between the players in the market, there are no transactions costs such 
as taxes when securities are bought and sold, and none of the market participants 
is large enough to influence the price of securities with their transactions.29  
 
7.1.1. THE!PREFERENTIAL!TAX!HYPOTHESIS!
Moving away from the perfect capital market and taking into account taxes, share 
repurchases seem to be more attractive and not substitutable to dividends. 
Dividends and share buybacks trigger different kinds of taxes. Dividends, in the 
U.S., are taxed as income whereas the proceeds from share buybacks resulting 
from an increasing share price are taxed at capital gains tax. In the past the capital 
gains tax was significantly lower than the income tax, which induced corporations 
to start choosing buybacks over dividends to lower tax payments for shareholders. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
28 Grullon, G./ Michaely, R., Journal of Finance, Dividend Substitution Hypothesis (2002). 
29 Miller, M. H./ Modigliani, F., Journal of Business, Dividend Policy (1961). 
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30 This hypothesis is still valid in countries that tax dividends at a lower rate than 
capital gains.31  
Nowadays capital gains and dividends are taxed at the same rate. Sellers that have 
held shares beyond a one-year period are subject to a 15%-20% capital gains tax, 
when their marginal income tax rate is within the 25%-39,6% bracket 32 . 
Dividends are taxed the same 15%-20% when the recipients find themselves in 
the 25%-39,6% tax-bracket and are holder of the common stock for more than 60 
days.33 However dividend payments trigger a tax event every time they are 
distributed to the shareholders. Proceeds from share repurchases remain untaxed 
until the shareholder decides to sell his holdings.  
In case an investor is not seeking for income but decides to reinvest dividend 
payments by buying more shares of the company, the investor would be better of 
with repurchases as payout instrument. Each time the investor receives the 
dividend he can reinvest 15%-20% less, because taxes have to be deducted. 
Repurchases by contrast increase the share price but trigger no taxes. 
For the reinvesting shareholder share repurchases are therefore preferable to 
dividend payments based on a taxation point of view.34 
7.1.2. THE!CASHCFLOW!PERMANENCE!HYPOTHESIS!
Surveys show that dividends are used to payout stable earnings, whereas share 
buybacks are used to distribute extraordinary, less sustainable earnings. 35 
Companies are reluctant to increase the dividend to an unsustainable level and 
seek for other ways to distribute earnings in buying back shares, as it has been 
discovered that share prices negatively react to dividend decreases. Whereas not 
renewing or slowing down share repurchases is not perceived as badly by markets 
since buybacks never include a commitment for future payouts. Furthermore 
repurchasing fewer shares than intended or totally stop repurchasing can also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Amromin, G./ Harrison, P./ Liang, N. et al., Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Dividend Tax Cut 
(2005). 
31 Grullon, G./ Michaely, R., Journal of Finance, Dividend Substitution Hypothesis (2002). 
32 Wells Fargo, Tax Treatment of Dividend Income (2013). 
33 Tax Foundation, Federal Capital Gains Tax Rates, 1988-2013 (2013). 
34 Value-Aktien, Aktienrückkäufe aus Sicht der Aktionäre (2012). 
35 Jagannathan, M./ Stephens, C. P./ Weisbach, M. S., Journal of Financial Economics, choice between 
dividends and stock repurchases (2000). 
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indicate that other more profitable investments were found and thus prompt a 
positive reaction.36 
 7.2. SHARE!REPURCHASES,!DIVIDENDS!AND!EMPLOYEE!STOCK!OPTIONS!
Apart from a beneficial taxation for the non-income seeking shareholder, share 
repurchases are also preferable to dividends when employee stock options (ESO) 
are granted to employees.  
ESOs are a kind of equity compensation that companies give out to their 
employees. Employees holding ESOs have the right to purchase stock of their 
company at a determined price (strike price) and quantity. Usually ESOs are 
equipped with a so-called vesting period during which the option holder is 
restricted to exercise the ESOs. All this is settled in the option agreement. After 
the expiration of the vesting period ESOs can be exercised, which means stock 
can be acquired at strike price, and then be sold immediately at market price. 
Consequently the greater the difference between strike- market price the more 
valuable is the ESO and hence employee compensation.37 Employees are granted 
stock options as a compensation for several reasons. Less well-capitalized 
companies use stock options to be able to preserve funds that they otherwise 
would have to spend when compensating in cash. Furthermore giving out ESOs to 
employees aligns interests of shareholders and employees. Both parties now 
benefit from an appreciating share price. In consequence employees are likely to 
become more effective and productive which streamlines the business and puts 
shareholder value in focus.38  
Most of the time issued ESOs are not dividend protected, which means that 
dividend payments to shareholders lead to a decrease in option value. Every time 
a company pays a dividend, the share price decreases by the distributed amount. 
After that markdown the stock trades ex-dividend. The value of ESOs is always 
tied to the underlying; in that case the share price of the company that grants the 
ESOs. A share price reduction caused by dividend payments thus reduces the 
value of ESOs. Consequently ESOs of a company that does not pay a dividend are 
more valuable than ESOs of an equal company that does. Share repurchases don’t !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
37 Summa, J., Employee Stock Options (2009). 
38 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
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have that markdown disadvantage and hence are more beneficial to ESO 
holders.39 
Therefore to maximize personal net worth top-level executives holding significant 
amounts of ESOs are incentivized to favor share repurchases over dividend 
payments.40 A study by Christine Jolls supports that theory. The findings show 
that at companies heavily relying on ESO based compensation more shares are 
repurchased than at companies less reliant on that kind of employee 
compensation.41 
 8. MOTIVATIONS!FOR!SHARE!REPURCHASES!
This chapter intends to outline the various reasons for corporation´s to repurchase 
their shares. In 2005 Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely conducted a survey 
where 384 financial executives were questioned and another 23 executives were 
interviewed about their motives for share buybacks. 
The most mentioned reason for repurchasing shares was an undervaluation of the 
company at current share prices and the objective to inform shareholders about 
that. Those two buyback reasons can be summarized and explained by the 
Undervaluation Hypothesis or Signaling Theory. Coming in second was the 
motivation to initiate a share repurchase program to increase earnings per share. 
The matter behind that is covered in the Increasing Earnings per Share 
Hypothesis. Another frequently named motivation for repurchasing stock was the 
Optimization of the Capital Structure, without having to take on additional 
debt.42 
In the following chapter theories behind those motivations will be explained in 
detail. However this paper does not cover share repurchases without the intention 
of having a direct impact on shareholder value, such as defending the company 
against a takeover, repurchasing shares that serve as an acquisition currency or 
repurchasing shares that are held back for later reissuance. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
40 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
41 Jolls, C., Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation (1998). 
42 Brav, A./ Graham, J. R./ Harvey, C. R. et al., Tuck Contemporary Corporate Finance Issues III Conference 
Paper Payout policy in the 21st century (2005). 
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8.1. OPTIMIZATION!OF!CAPITAL!STRUCTURE!
Share repurchases as stated above can be used as an instrument to optimize the 
capital structure of a company without taking on additional debt. By that 
repurchases are able to maximize a firm´s value. The capital structure informs 
about how a firm has financed its assets, a combination of borrowed money (debt) 
and owners’ funds (equity). Capital structure is commonly measured by the debt-
to-equity ratio or debt-to-asset ratio.43  
 !"#$/!"#$%& = !"#$%&'(! "#$!"#$%&  
 
This combination defines the cost of capital, which affects the value of the 
business. The lower the cost of capital, the higher is the value of the business 
respectively shareholder value, which incentivizes executives to optimize the 
capital structure.44 
 
Modigliani and Miller found out that in a perfect capital market scenario the 
capital structure does not influence the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
of a company and hence its value. WACC represent the minimum return that a 
company has to earn on its investments, determined by the weighted average of 
cost of debt and cost of equity.45 Usually debt financing a business is cheaper than 
using equity, since in the event of default creditors´ claims are served prior to 
those of equity holders. In consequence equity holders demand a higher premium 
than creditors for taking the additional risk of being served second, which makes 
debt cheaper than equity. 
Nevertheless loading up on cheap debt in a perfect capital market environment 
will not lower the WACC, because the benefits of a more debt weighted capital 
structure are perfectly offset by an increase in cost of equity. In fact more 
seniority debt make the equity investment more risky as in the event of default the 
risk to suffer a complete loss rises. Commanding a higher return on the equity 
investment compensates for the additional risk, hence cost of equity rises. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Vermaelen, T., Foundations and Trends in Finance, Share Repurchases (2005). p. 68 - 69 
44 Damodaran, A., The Debt-Equity Trade Off: The Capital Structure Decision (2003). 
45 Modigliani, F./ Miller, M. H., American Economic Review, The Cost of Capital (1958). 
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Therefore in a perfect capital market there is no valuation-benefit to be realized 
from taking on debt. Thus companies would be indifferent choosing their capital 
structure.46 
Leaving behind the scenario of a perfect capital market and introducing taxes 
there is a different outcome. The interest payment on debt is tax-deductible 
reducing the overall tax burden by the amount of the total interest payments times 
the firm´s marginal tax-rate. Literature describes this benefit as “Tax-Shield”. It 
makes debt cheaper and more preferable than equity. Using a more debt weighted 
capital structure thus reduces WACC and positively influences a firm’s value. 
 !"## = !! + ! ∗ !" + !! + ! ∗ !" ∗ (1− !) 
Where:&E&=&shareholders&equity,&D&=&long7term&debt,&ke&=&cost&of&equity,&kd&=&cost&of&debt.&
 
It therefore could be assumed that 100% debt financing would be best for every 
business, but that is not the case. There are limits to what degree a company can 
be levered beneficially. When a certain debt to equity ratio is reached WACC are 
increasing again, because the company becomes more and more unlikely (risky) 
to be able to serve its interest payments, as payments take an increasing share out 
of the earnings. Hence creditors are exposed to an increasing default risk and 
command high premiums when they decide to lend money to an already highly 
levered company.47 
 
It should be every management´s target, when it has committed itself to maximize 
shareholder value, to adjust the capital structure by leveraging the balance sheet in 
a way that minimizes the WACC and in consequence increases intrinsic value. By 
buying back shares the capital structure can be adjusted in order to achieve a more 
favorable capital structure without taking on additional debt. Taking on debt to 
repurchase shares accelerates this effect. Repurchasing and retiring shares reduce 
the equity base of the company by exactly the amount that was spent on the 
acquired shares (see chapter “accounting of share buybacks”). As the total equity 
base is reduced and liabilities stay unaffected or increase, given that the buyback 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Villamil, A. P., The Modigliani-Miller Theorem (2012). 
47 Damodaran, A., Corporate Finance: Capital Structure and Financing Decisions (2002). 
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is debt financed, the capital structure becomes more debt weighted (higher 
debt/assets). Eventually that lowers WACC, enhances the firm´s value and 
benefits shareholder value (Figure3).48 
 
Figure 3: WACC and Debt/Equity Ratio 
 
Theory defines the value of a company as the equation of all future cash flows 
generated by the assets of a company and discounted by the firm´s WACC. Firm 
value for this reason increases along with lower WACC, as future earnings are 
discounted at a lower rate.49 
 
! = !!!1+!"## !!!!!  
Where:&V&=&company&value,&CF&=&future&free&cash7flows&&
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Dobbs, R./ Rehm, W., Mc Kinsey & Company Member Edition, The value of share buybacks (2005). 
49 Gartzke, C./ Hedemann, K./ Schütt-Schnoor, K., Methoden der Unternehmensbewertung (2013). 
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8.2. INCREASING!EARNINGS!PER!SHARE!HYPOTHESIS!
Among the questioned executives in the aforementioned survey buying back stock 
to increase earnings per share (EPS) was a widespread reason. 50  EPS are 
calculated by dividing net income by the total number of shares outstanding51. 
 !"# = !"#!!"#$%&!"#$%!!ℎ!"#$! "#$#%&'(&) 
 
The following example explains the impact of share repurchases on EPS: 
Assumed a firm has 1.000.000 shares outstanding and the following balance sheet 
and income statement: 
 
Assets Equity / Liabilities 
Cash                               8.000.000 USD Equity                          40.000.000 USD 
Operating Assets         32.000.000 USD  
Total Assets                  40.000.000USD Total Equity and Liab. 40.000.000 USD 
Table 1: Model Company Balance Sheet Before Buyback !
Assets Equity / Liabilities 
Cash                                        / Equity                          32.000.000 USD 
Operating Assets         32.000.000 USD  
Total Assets                 32.000.000 USD  Total Equity and Liab. 32.000.000 USD  
Table 2: Model Company Balance Sheet After Buyback !
USD Before Buyback After Buyback 
Interest Income (3%)                             240.000                             
Operating Income                          1.760.000                          1.760.000 
Total Income                          2.000.000                          1.760.000 
Table 3: Model Company Income 
The value of the operating business earning USD 1.760.000 annually is USD 
17.600.000 based on a DCF calculation52. Additional to the operating business the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Brav, A./ Graham, J. R./ Harvey, C. R. et al., Tuck Contemporary Corporate Finance Issues III Conference 
Paper Payout policy in the 21st century (2005). 
51 E&Y, Financial reporting developments A comprehensive guide: Earnings per share (2013). 
52 DCF based on hurdle rate of 10% and no future growth. Hurdle rate equals WACC 
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firm holds USD 8.000.000 in cash, (earning USD 240.000 in interest income 
annually) which equals a total intrinsic value of USD 25.600.000. Distributed on 
1.000.000 shares equals a shares price of USD 25,6.  
 
USD Before Buyback After Buyback 
Value of Operations                        17.600.000                        17.600.000 
Cash                          8.000.000                                  
Total Value of Equity                        25.600.000                        17.600.000 
Table 4: Model Company Valuation 
 
Using the above mentioned data (income before buyback USD 2.000.000 and 
1.000.000 shares outstanding) EPS of USD 2 are calculated. 
 !"#$%"!!"#$%&':!!"# = 2.000.0001.000.000 = 2! 
 
The firm now decides to use all of its cash to repurchase and retire shares, paying 
USD 25,6 for each share, the firm is able to repurchase 312.500 shares. That 
leaves the company with now 687.500 shares outstanding followed by a decrease 
in income to USD 1.760.000 (Table 4). That is the case as the total amount of 
USD 8.000.000 in cash on the balance sheet was used to buyback shares, and 
therefore ceases to earn interest of USD 240.000 p.a. EPS after the buyback 
consequently increase to USD 2,56. 
 !"#$%!!"#$%&':!!"# = 1.760.000687.500 = 2,56 
 
Nevertheless the businesses intrinsic value (based on a DCF-calculation) does not 
increase along with EPS. In fact income falls by USD 240.000 as the firm misses 
out on interest payments and thus its intrinsic value is lowered.53 The increase in 
EPS is only derived from a reduction of the equation´s denominator (shares 
outstanding), which indicates the number of shares that total income is distributed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Dobbs, R./ Rehm, W., Mc Kinsey & Company Member Edition, The value of share buybacks (2005). 
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on. That makes every share now accounting for a bigger part of net income and 
the whole business as compared to before the buyback54. 
 
An important ratio in conjunction with EPS is the price to earnings ratio (P/E), 
which is often used by investors to compare valuations of companies of the same 
industry. It also reveals future EPS growth expectations that investors have in the 
stock. The higher the P/E the higher are expected future EPS. 
 ! ! = !!ℎ!"#!!"#$%!"#  
 
Using the above data the buyback-effect on the P/E ratio can be made obvious. 
 !"#$%"!!"#$%&':! ! = 25,62 = 12,8 !"#$%!!"#$%&':! ! = 25,62,56 = 10 
 
The P/E ratio falls after shares are bought back and retired, because the loss in 
income due to the missing interest proceeds is more than offset by an increasing 
EPS induced by the reduced share count.  
The drop of the P/E ratio can also be explained as follows: The share buyback acts 
like a separator that deconsolidates the business into two independent units. One 
unit represents cash and carries a P/E of 33,33! the other unit representing the 
businesses operations carries a P/E of 10,00. The P/E of 12,8 represents the 
weighted P/E ratio of both units. When the cash position is fully used to fund the 
buyback the P/E lowers to that of the operating business, a P/E of 10.55 
 
It could be assumed that a share price appreciation would take place after the 
buyback as earnings are now distributed over less outstanding shares, which 
makes every share representing a bigger part of the company´s earnings. But the 
increase in EPS, triggered by the lower share count, is perfectly offset by a 
decrease in intrinsic value (see Table 5 intrinsic value and shares outstanding !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
55 Dobbs, R./ Rehm, W., Mc Kinsey & Company Member Edition, The value of share buybacks (2005). 
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decrease 31,25%), hence the share price remains unchanged and in theory no 
value is created for shareholders by the repurchase. 56 
 
USD Before Buyback After Buyback  
Intrinsic Value               25.600.000               17.600.000             31,25% 
Shares Outstanding                 1.000.000                    687.500             31,25% 
Share Price                          25,6                          25,6                unch. 
Table 5: Model Company Share Price Development 
 
After having found out that in theory there is no share price increase after 
executing a buyback to boost EPS it is astonishing to see that executives consider 
buybacks as a way to increase EPS as important in the survey conducted by Brav 
et al.57 
 
Another less mechanical approach by Paul Hribar et al. could help to explain that. 
In their 2004 study the authors uncovered that some firms show unusually high 
volumes of repurchases of their own stock to boost EPS when they are likely to 
trail past EPS growth rates or analyst´s quarterly EPS estimates. In other years 
when forecasts are likely to be met lower repurchase activity could be 
witnessed.58 According to a survey by Barth et al 1999 markets grant premium 
multiples to companies showing steadily rising EPS over a longer period. A break 
of that habit often causes P/E ratios and thus share price to correct.59 The same 
holds true for missing quarterly analyst EPS estimates.60  
Managers are therefore closely monitoring and managing EPS using share 
repurchases to make sure estimates or prior growth rates are met and share price 
does not fall due to a negative earnings surprise. 
E.g. if a company (A) is estimated to report USD 6,05 in EPS an runs slightly 
short of that number by reporting only USD 6,00 a share it would see its share !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Dobbs, R./ Rehm, W., Mc Kinsey & Company Member Edition, The value of share buybacks (2005). 
57 Brav, A./ Graham, J. R./ Harvey, C. R. et al., Tuck Contemporary Corporate Finance Issues III Conference 
Paper Payout policy in the 21st century (2005). 
58 Hribar, P./ Jenkins, N. T./ Johnson, W. B., Journal of Accounting and Economics, Repurchases as an 
Earnings Management Device (2006). 
59 Barth, M. E./ Elliott, J. A./ Finn, M. W., Journal of Accounting Research, patterns of increasing earnings 
(1999). 
60 Skinner, D. J./ Sloan, R. G., Earnings Surprises (1999). 
!! 19!
price decline after the reporting earnings to the market. In contrast another 
company (B) (also estimated to report USD 6,05 but likely to report EPS falling 
short of that number) decides prior to earnings to react to the shortfall by buying 
back 10.000 shares. Hence B reports USD 6,06, beating estimates by a small 
margin, and sees its share price holding steady or increase after the earnings. 
Both companies are exactly the same with the only difference that company B 
successfully managed its EPS.61 
Table 6: Model Company Earnings Estimates 
 
Alongside the influence on EPS, share buybacks are impacting other financial 
ratios, as well. The shortened equity base directly impacts the profitability ratios 
return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) and basically every other ratio 
denominated by equity or total assets. ROE is a measurement for profitability that 
informs about how much a company earns on every dollar of equity invested.62 
 
The same holds true for ROA, which indicates how much is earned by the total 
assets of a company. A company with unchanged net income that executes on a 
share repurchase would deliver both increasing ROE and ROA since the equity 
and total asset base is reduced.63 Buybacks can therefore be used to tweak these 
ratios to match previously set targets. 
 !"# = !"#!!"#$%&!ℎ!"#ℎ!"#$%´!!!"#$%& 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
62 Buhl, K., Kennzahlen: Der Return on Equity (ROE) (2011). 
63 Neus, W., Einführung in die Betriebswirtschaftslehre aus institutionenökonomischer Sicht (2009). p.348 
 Company A Company B 
Net Income                          6.000.000                          6.000.000 
Beg. Shares Outstanding                          1.000.000                          1.000.000 
Shares Repurchased                               10.000                                   / 
End. Shares Outstanding                             990.000                          1.000.000 
EPS Estimate                                   6,05                                   6,05 
EPS Reported                                   6,06                                   6,00 
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!"# = !"#!!"#$%&!"#$%!!""#$" 
Where:&Total&Assets&=&Shareholder´s&Equity&+&Total&Liabilities&
 
Another financial ratio impacted by buybacks is the net asset value per share, or 
book value per share (BVPS) of a company. Investors often use this ratio as an 
indicator to uncover undervalued equities. Book value equals the total assets of a 
firm net its total liabilities. To arrive at BVPS the book value is divided by total 
shares outstanding. When shares are bought back below book value (current share 
price > BVPS) book value per share increases, otherwise a decrease can be 
witnessed.64 
 !"#$ = !""#!!"#$%!"#$%!!ℎ!"#$! "#$#%&'(&) 
 8.2.1. OFFSETTING!DILUTION!OF!EQUITY!COMPENSATION!PLANS!
As explained before, the number of shares outstanding of a company influences 
several per share metrics such as EPS. With an increasing number of shares 
outstanding due to the issuance of stock based compensation, such as ESOs, those 
numbers are diluted and negatively impacted. Some companies therefore try to 
offset the caused dilution by repurchasing shares.65 In his 1998 survey, Scott J. 
Weisbrenner proved that thesis. He uncovered a positive correlation of 
outstanding ESOs and the repurchase behavior of companies. The costs of ESOs 
according to him are reflected best in the EPS numbers that decrease alongside an 
increasing number of shares outstanding. A steady buyback with the size able to 
offset the ESO dilution can therefore hide ESO related costs as it boosts EPS. 
Additionally he states that EPS are often used to measure management 
performance, which gives additional incentive to perform a buyback that offsets 
EPS dilution.66 The repurchases that are transferring the wealth from shareholders 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Little, K., Understanding Book Value (not specified). 
65 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
66 Weisbenner, S. J., Corporate Share Repurchases and Stock Options (2000). 
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to employees, hence share buybacks that offset the dilution represent the cost of 
ESOs.67 
 8.3. UNDERVALUATION!HYPOTHESIS!/!SIGNALING!THEORY!
Most mentioned reason to justify a share repurchase among the executives 
questioned in the survey by Brav et al. was that shares are repurchased, because 
executives considered their shares undervalued.68 The undervaluation hypothesis 
therefore is finding a lot of appreciation in literature. This paper puts that theory 
in its center, as it seems that it gives the best hints on how to increase long-term 
shareholder value by repurchasing shares. 
 
As the name “undervaluation hypothesis” suggests, the theory claims that 
executives buy back shares because of an undervaluation of their company at the 
current stock price. A corporation´s shares are undervalued when they trade below 
intrinsic value.69 The intrinsic value can be defined as the sum of all future 
discounted cash flows that a business will earn in its lifetime.70 Hence executives 
are repurchasing shares when, in their opinion, the stock is trading at a discount to 
intrinsic value. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a very suitable example of a 
corporation acting according to the undervaluation hypothesis. Warren Buffett, 
chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., informed investors in his 2012 
letter to shareholders that his company would repurchase shares every time they 
trade below 120% of book value per share, which according to Buffett presents a 
meaningful discount to intrinsic value. At that price level he sees his company´s 
shares significantly undervalued. In addition to his repurchasing commitment he 
emphasized that repurchasing shares above the intrinsic value would hurt 
shareholder value.71 
To explain why a repurchase of overvalued shares hurts shareholder value it is 
necessary to distinguish between shareholders participating in the buyback 
program and continuing stockholders holding on to their shares. If a shareholder !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
68 Brav, A./ Graham, J. R./ Harvey, C. R. et al., Tuck Contemporary Corporate Finance Issues III Conference 
Paper Payout policy in the 21st century (2005). 
69 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
70 Howell, R., The Wallstreet Journal., Intrinsic Value (2013). 
71 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2012 (2013). 
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decides to participate in the repurchase program and sells his shares to the 
company he will most likely benefit nevertheless shares are over- or underpriced. 
The increased demand for the shares caused by the repurchasing company usually 
gives prices a short-term lift since demand for the shares increases. Additionally 
signaling produces stock price rises after the announcement of a share 
repurchase.72 
The case is different with continuing shareholders that do not capitalize from 
short-term share price gains and decide not to sell their shares to the company. 
Continuing shareholders should have significant interest in management 
repurchasing only undervalued shares, as intrinsic value is affected by the 
buybacks. If overvalued shares are bought back the intrinsic value of a business 
decreases and shareholder value is eventually going to be destroyed. The 
following example illustrates that73. 
 
A company with the below balance sheet and income statement decides to 
repurchase shares using all of its USD 8 million of cash. Prior to the repurchase 
the company had one million shares outstanding. In the chapter before the 
intrinsic value for the same company was calculated. It equaled USD 25,6 million 
or USD 25,6 on a per share basis assuming a yield on cash of 3% and a 10% 
hurdle rate. 
Assets Equity / Liabilities 
Cash                               8.000.000 USD Equity                          40.000.000 USD 
Operating Assets         32.000.000 USD  
Total Assets                 40.000.000 USD Total Equity and Liab. 40.000.000 USD 
Table 7: Model Company Balance Sheet !
USD Before Buyback After Buyback 
Interest Income (3%)                             240.000                                  /        
Operating Income                          1.760.000                          1.760.000 
Total Income                          2.000.000                          1.760.000 
Intrinsic Value 25.600.000 17.600.000 
Table 8: Model Company Income Statement and Intrinsic Value !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Vermaelen, T., Foundations and Trends in Finance, Share Repurchases (2005). p. 67 ff 
73 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2011 (2012). 
!! 23!
The shares now trade below intrinsic value at USD 20 a share. Thus the firm is 
able to repurchase 400.000 of its shares with its USD 8 million in cash, which 
reduces outstanding shares to 600.000. Spending cash in order to acquire own 
shares, as previously explained, reduces intrinsic value since the company is 
missing out on interest payments. Intrinsic value after the repurchase hence 
decreases to USD 17.6 million.  
However repurchasing shares below intrinsic value reduces the share count at a 
higher rate than intrinsic value of the business is decreasing. Shares outstanding of 
the model company decrease at a 40% rate, whereas intrinsic value falls just 
31,25%. On a per share basis though, intrinsic value increases 14,57%, from USD 
25,6 to USD 29,33 per share making each share more valuable for investors (table 
9). 
 
USD Before Buyback After Buyback Alteration 
Intrinsic Value         25.600.000               17.600.000           - 31,25% 
Shares Outstanding           1.000.000                    600.000           - 40,00% 
Intrinsic Value / Share                  25,60                        29,33          +14,57% 
Share Price                  20,00   
Shares Repurchased              400.000   
Table 9: Model Company Buyback of Undervalued Shares !
The other way round the same holds true for repurchasing shares above intrinsic 
value, in this example at 30 USD. Share count falls at a lower rate (-26,67%) as 
only 266.666 shares can be bought back with USD 8 million, however intrinsic 
value decreases by the same amount (-31,25%). Intrinsic value per share 
consequently falls and each share now represents only USD 24 in intrinsic value, 
USD 1,6 less than prior to the repurchase. For the investor that implies a 
destruction of value caused by the share repurchase (table 10). 
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USD Before Buyback After Buyback Alteration 
Intrinsic Value         25.600.000               17.600.000           - 31,25% 
Shares Outstanding           1.000.000                    733.333           - 26,67% 
Intrinsic Value / Share                  25,60                        24,00            - 6,25% 
Share Price                  30,00   
Shares Repurchased              266.666   
Table 10: Model Company Buyback of Overvalued Shares !
Markets are said to behave efficiently. That would implicate that the share price 
represents intrinsic value at any time. However from time to time markets happen 
to misprice equities and share prices deviate from intrinsic value (both to the up- 
and downside). That creates opportunities for companies to increase intrinsic 
value by repurchasing undervalued shares but also sets pitfalls of destroying value 
when overpriced shares are acquired.74 
 
In his 2011 letter to shareholders Buffett additionally expressed that his intention 
is not to cash out shareholders cheaply by repurchasing undervalued shares, but to 
inform about the corporation´s value and assets that shareholders are selling when 
participating in the buyback program.75 This behavior is called signaling and goes 
hand in hand with the undervaluation hypothesis. Every time a corporation 
repurchases shares its executives are sending a signal to the markets that, in their 
opinion, shares are trading at a discount to intrinsic value. This is understood as a 
sign that the share price does not correctly reflect future cash flows and hence 
suggests that the market undervalues the company at current share prices.76 
Executives are typically having much better insight and access to information in 
their company than outside investors have; an information asymmetry between 
company insiders (executives) and non-insiders exists. Therefore executives are 
credited of being able to value their own company more accurately than non-
insiders. 77  Since executives are appointed to act according to the owners 
(shareholders) interest, they are trusted to only repurchase undervalued shares 
since acquiring overvalued stock would diminish intrinsic value and hurt !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Graham, B., Intelligent Investieren (2005). p. 224 ff 
75 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2011 (2012). 
76 Efficient markets do not have information asymmetries.  
77 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2011 (2012). 
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shareholders. Because of this, communicating or signaling of an undervaluation of 
the company by buying back shares is highly valuable to shareholders. This is 
also the reason why usually investors are buying up shares right after the 
announcement of the buyback to take immediate advantage of the prevailing 
mispricing. Consequently rising stock prices can be witnessed after the 
announcement of a share buyback.78 
 
Having discussed both the Undervaluation Hypothesis and the Signaling Theory it 
becomes obvious that they always belong together. However the undervaluation 
of a company seems to provide a better explanation to why executives choose to 
buy back shares, while signaling gives a more sufficient answer as to why the 
share price is usually reacting positively right after the buyback announcement.79 
 
However there are various pitfalls when shares are acquired due to an 
undervaluation. The most obvious prevailing risk is, whether or not executives are 
right with their statement that shares are actually undervalued. Corporations and 
their executives barely give insight into how they calculate the intrinsic value of 
their companies, which makes it hard for shareholders to validate the correctness 
of a repurchase decision.  
Another difficulty that arises is a problem related to Agency Theory. The interests 
of shareholders and the management of a company originally do not align. Each 
party is desired to increase their own net-worth. Shareholders are eager to see 
their company and share price thriving, whereas managers seek for the highest 
possible compensation to increase their own net worth. Accordingly if 
repurchasing shares can raise compensation the management could be willing to 
even repurchase overvalued shares that destroy intrinsic value.80 
 9. AGENCY!THEORY!
Agency Theory deals with the separation of ownership and control within a 
company. Usually managers (agent) raise capital from investors (principal), 
because they do not have sufficient funds themselves to invest, or they want to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
79 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
80 Shleifer, A./ Vishny, R. W., Journal of Finance, A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
!! 26!
cash out on their holdings of the business. Contrary the investor possesses excess 
capital and needs the skills of the manager to generate a return on the capital. 
After having invested the capital it is at the manager´s disposal. Consequently that 
raises the question of how the investor can be assured that the manager is acting to 
the investor´s benefit and is not wasting the money. A lack of security that 
managers act in the interest of investors would result in a high risk to fund 
businesses and accordingly decrease investments.81 
 
To be sure that managers act in favor of investors a contract between the parties is 
necessary. The optimal contract would be a contract fully aligning the interests of 
investor and management. It would be determined how profits are split between 
investor and manager and specified what is done with the capital in every 
imaginable situation. However in the field, contracts never proved to be optimal 
since a contract is not sufficient to regulate every eventuality because the future 
cannot be foreseen.82 That’s why the parties have to find a solution to allocate the 
residual control rights. Residual control rights are needed to give a party the 
decision power in events not specified by the contract. But how should these 
control rights be distributed? 
The residual control rights could be given entirely to the investors in return for 
providing the funding. Meaning in an event where a decision has to be made on a 
subject not specified in the contract the manger has to consult the investors and let 
them decide. But as initially mentioned the investor hires the manager for his 
special skills. As the manager has all the specific knowledge and insights to the 
company´s operations he is more suitable to exercise the control rights. An 
information asymmetry exists. Investors are generally too uninformed to make 
decisions on how to allocate funds. Especially when ownership is spread among 
many small investors it is likely that some are not informed and don´t even want 
to learn about the company they have invested in. Hence participating in the 
governing of the company is not a reasonable option. Managers therefore end up 
with significant power and control rights and are able to independently allocate 
capital.83 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Shleifer, A./ Vishny, R. W., Journal of Finance, A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
82 van der Wijst, N., Agency theory and corporate governance (2013). 
83 Shleifer, A./ Vishny, R. W., Journal of Finance, A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
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Those extensive control rights held by managers pose significant risk to investors. 
In the past managers have expropriated investors, by allocating funds in a way 
only serving their profit. E.g. managers have sold investor´s assets at a large 
discount to companies owned by the managers themselves. Nowadays law 
protects against that kind of theft, however that does not fully prevent fraud. Less 
obvious actions to the negative for investors are still occurring nowadays, such as 
managers that increase the size of the firm to an extent that hurts returns and 
shareholder value but benefits their own goals.84 The loss a company takes 
because of self-interested manager behavior and the company´s actions to prevent 
that behavior is referred to as agency cost. With managers being able to pursue 
self-interested actions with the goal of maximizing own net worth, regardless 
investors are benefited or harmed, additional solutions have to be found to protect 
investor´s funds from getting wasted.85 
 
 
Figure 4: Agency Theory Illustration 
 
Basically there are two major solutions to reduce agency cost. One is to give out 
incentive contracts to managers and the other one is the development of advanced 
monitoring systems to be able to better judge managerial behavior. Information 
systems to reveal the behavior of managers in a company are e.g. detailed reports 
on the operations of a business, an independent auditor and a functioning board of 
directors that effectively supervises the behavior of managers 86  Incentive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Shleifer, A./ Vishny, R. W., Journal of Finance, A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
85 van der Wijst, N., Agency theory and corporate governance (2013). 
86 Eisenhardt, K. M., Academy of Management Review. , Agency Theory (1989). 
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contracts are attempting to align investors and managers interests. The larger the 
benefits are that a manger can reap from residual control the costlier incentivizing 
becomes. Efficient incentive contracts are tied to a ratio that reliably measures 
management performance. Such contracts can occur in different forms e.g. equity 
compensation by awarding stock options and direct ownership of shares (to make 
the manager an owner of the company, too) or compensation based on factors 
such as EPS or ROE.87 
Contracting managers always presents a tradeoff of cost to monitor, measure 
behavior and the cost used for incentive contracts and performance measurement. 
Otherwise put, information in a corporation can be viewed as a commodity that 
has a cost and can be purchased. When advanced information systems are 
purchased to effectively monitor manager behavior, less cost has to be used on 
incentive instruments and vice versa.88 
Summarized, efficient monitoring and effective incentive contracts help to reduce 
agency cost. Nevertheless if those instruments are flawed they create huge self-
dealing opportunities for managers and by that pose significant risk to investors. 
These risks basically originate from either wrongly set up incentive contracts and 
flawed monitoring systems. 
 
!
Figure 5: Manager Self-Dealing 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Shleifer, A./ Vishny, R. W., Journal of Finance, A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
88 Eisenhardt, K. M., Academy of Management Review. , Agency Theory (1989). 
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9.1. CORPORATE!GOVERNANCE!
In the U.S., the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance presents a frameset 
to protect shareholder interests and to legally tackle agency problems. U.S. 
corporate governance puts in center shareholder interests, whereas other corporate 
governance codes are aiming to protect other stakeholders´ interests such as 
employees, as well. The main bodies that U.S. corporate governance is comprised 
of are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the statues of the SEC, guidelines of the most 
important stock exchanges NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) and NASD 
(National Association of Security Dealers) and regional state law (e.g. Delaware 
Corporate Law).89 Among the tasks of corporate governance are to ensure that 
shareholders participate in governing the company by voting on important issues 
at shareholder meetings and electing a board of directors to supervise managers. 
Further corporate governance makes sure that relevant information about key 
executives and the board members is disclosed. 
To protect shareholder interests U.S. corporate governance defines 
responsibilities, structure and composure of the board of directors that observes 
firm executives. To follow the shareholder-centered approach of corporate 
governance publicly listed firms are hierarchically organized, with management at 
the bottom and shareholders represented by the board of directors at the top.90 
  
U.S. Corporate governance statues differ from state to state as each state has 
imposed its own acts on corporate governance. Nevertheless the key functions of 
the board are universal and comprise of advisory and oversight tasks. Key 
functions are defining a broad corporate strategy, approving yearly budgets, 
informing about the company´s performance and ensuring independent auditing. 
Most important for the purpose of this paper is the function of appointing the 
CEO, monitor CEO performance and determining the compensation of the 
company executives.91 
The board of directors as the highest entity of a corporation has to be elected by 
the shareholders. When there are board vacancies there is a nominating committee 
composed of board directors that nominate a candidate for the position. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Valuewalk, Corporate Governance: USA Versus Europe (2013). 
90 OECD, OECD Publishing, Board Member Nomination and Election (2012). 
91 Larcker, D. F., Board of Directors: Duties & Liabilities (2011). 
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nominee then has to be approved by shareholder vote. According to Delaware 
Corporate Law shareholders have one vote per voting share unless the corporation 
has disclosed otherwise. Most of the publicly listed companies in the U.S. conduct 
a system of majority votes. A candidate requires the majority of all the votes 
casted at shareholder meetings to be elected a member of the board. Delaware 
Corporate Law requires the annual appointment of the board of directors. The 
company can freely choose the number of members appointed to the board. An 
average U.S. board is comprised of 10 to 11 directors.92 
U.S. boards of directors are one-tiered boards meaning both executive and non-
executive directors are present in the same board. Executive directors are 
members of the board that also serve in the management of the company, which 
makes them non-independent directors. There is no specific number of 
independent board members required that are in no relationship to the company 
and its management. Only the disclosure of any kind of relation is required. The 
recent past shows a trend to totally independent boards or boards with the CEO as 
only executive serving on the board. Nevertheless there are marginal cases of 
boards that are comprised of a high number of non-independent directors.93 
 9.2. AGENCY!THEORY,!CORPORATE!GOVERNANCE!AND!REPURCHASES!
Agency Theory deals with the separation of ownership and control. Managers 
controlling the company are eager to increase their own rather than the 
shareholder´s net worth. This is why manager´s have to be incentivized and 
monitored to assure they act according to shareholder´s interests.94 Corporate 
Governance provides the frameset to protect shareholder´s interests. 95 
Shareholders are represented by the board of directors, which oversees the 
management. The board determines executive incentives, compensation and 
monitors their performance.96  
Executives that have superior insight together with the board of directors propose 
share repurchase programs. Shareholders then may or may not approve the 
program. But usually the programs get approved since shareholders, which are not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 OECD, OECD Publishing, Board Member Nomination and Election (2012). 
93 OECD, OECD Publishing, Board Member Nomination and Election (2012). 
94 Shleifer, A./ Vishny, R. W., Journal of Finance, A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
95 OECD, OECD Publishing, Board Member Nomination and Election (2012). 
96 Larcker, D. F., Board of Directors: Duties & Liabilities (2011). 
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able to access inside information, trust management and the board on their ability 
to make a decision beneficial to shareholders.97 Optimal is a buyback decision that 
creates long-term value for shareholders by acquiring undervalued shares as 
elaborated in the chapter dealing with the undervaluation hypothesis. 
 
Based on the previous findings in this chapter following assumptions can be 
made, that are later verified by case studies. Incentive contracts and the board of 
directors significantly influence the buyback decision. Wrongly negotiated 
incentive compensation could motivate the management to propose a repurchase 
of overvalued shares only to increase personal net worth. A compensation based 
on per share targets could be such a flawed compensation. This would give the 
manager the opportunity to directly influence the ratios by buying back shares and 
raise his pay. The manager would likely purchase shares whenever he would 
otherwise fail to reach the set target even when shares are overvalued. Intrinsic 
value would then be destroyed and investor money wasted. 
The board to protect shareholder´s assets should not approve such repurchases of 
overvalued shares. A board however that does not effectively represent 
shareholders interests could be harmful for the owners of the firm and approve 
such repurchases. That could be the case when a board is consisting of a majority 
of non-independent directors. Furthermore such a board, with its ability to decide 
on management compensation could influence the repurchase decision by 
negotiating a doubtful compensation package as mentioned above. 
 10. WHAT!MAKES!A!SUCCESSFUL!SHARE!REPURCHASE?!
The first part of this paper discussed the different ways eligible for corporations to 
repurchase their shares. Among those the most important ones are the open 
market repurchase, the fixed price tender offer and the Dutch auction tender offer. 
After having explained how share buybacks are executed major theories as to why 
companies repurchase shares were illustrated and the impacts that these theories 
have on the companies were outlined. Among those reasons the most important 
ones were the repurchase of shares due to an undervaluation and the signaling of 
the same, the increase of EPS, and the optimization of the capital structure. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Allen, F./ Michaely, R., Payout Policy (2002). 
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Several other buyback reasons such as the dividend substitution will not be 
discussed further, but were mentioned to provide a more complete view of the 
subject. 
Furthermore the agency theory was explicated. Agency theory is fundamental to 
every corporation and its stakeholders as agency theory defines the important 
relationship of owner and manager. It reveals major conflicts that when left 
unresolved can confront the corporation with significant cost.98 
 
Based on these theoretical findings factors that benefit the success of share 
repurchases can be derived. As previously stated a successful share repurchase in 
this paper is defined as a buyback program that creates shareholder value over the 
long-term (more than five years) and not just right after the announcement of such 
a program. The only possibility to achieve that kind of long-term value creation is 
according to the undervaluation hypothesis to repurchase shares trading below 
intrinsic value. Repurchasing shares below intrinsic value increases intrinsic value 
per share, which in the long-term share prices tend to reflect.99 Effective signaling 
goes hand in hand with the undervaluation of share prices. The more management 
can be trusted on its committed to only repurchase undervalued shares the more 
effective signaling becomes.100 But which factors have to be given ensuring that 
only undervalued shares are repurchased? 
 
In the following factors that could provide answers to that question are compiled 
based on assumptions derived from the theoretical findings. Agency Theory gave 
two major levers that encouraged self-dealing opportunities for managers when 
wrongly applied. One of them being the incentive compensation and the other one 
monitoring instruments represented by the board of directors.101 
Derived from the prior findings incentive compensation has to align shareholders 
and executives interests on a long-term appreciation in shareholder value. If that is 
the case own shares should only be acquired when they trade below intrinsic 
value. To make executives acting according to those interests compensation 
should contain a large part of equity in form of e.g. restricted stock or ESOs that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Shleifer, A./ Vishny, R. W., Journal of Finance, A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997). 
99 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
100 Voss, J., Major Themes in Economics, Why Repurchase Stock? (2012). 
101 Eisenhardt, K. M., Academy of Management Review. , Agency Theory (1989). 
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have to be held over the long-term. Furthermore performance, which the level of 
compensation is based upon, should not be measured by per share numbers that 
can be influenced by share repurchases such as ROE or EPS. If that is wished 
anyway the performance measurements should be adjusted for the repurchased 
shares, to take out their effect on the numbers. Otherwise executives would 
repurchase as many shares as possible whether or not they are overvalued. 
 
Second the board of directors should consist of a high number of independent 
directors that are in no relationship to the executives. Those independent directors 
grant that repurchase decisions of the management are weighed soundly and are 
favorable to shareholders. 
Furthermore a majority shareholder pursuing other interests than the creation of 
long-term shareholder value could be harmful to a successful share repurchase. 
This is the case because a majority shareholder can control the board and thus is 
able to influence executives. These executives then certainly perform the 
repurchase decision according to the majority shareholders intentions. If these 
intentions do not align with other shareholders, for those such a repurchase is 
likely to have a negative outcome. 
Another necessary requirement should be that executives exactly know the 
intrinsic value of their firm to make a reasonable repurchase decision. An 
independent board and a correct compensation do not help if the management is 
not aware what their company really is worth. To tackle that problem it could be 
useful to tie the repurchase decision to a certain ratio such as BV and an adjusted 
P/E that resembles the value of the company effectively. 
All these assumptions are verified by the following case studies. 
 11. INVESTIGATION!METHODOLOGY!
After having elaborated the factors of success for share repurchases case studies 
will be presented to verify the findings. These case studies address U.S. listed 
companies that carried out share repurchases in the past or are still active buyers 
of their own stock. To verify the developed success factors both negative and 
positive examples of share repurchases will be put forth. 
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Each case study has its own purpose and validates certain factors by either 
showing how not respecting the factors of success negatively influences the 
company and shareholder returns or how acting according to the findings produce 
a successful share repurchase. 
The repurchase decisions will be investigated using SEC-filings such as annual 
reports, proxy statements, and other publicly accessible corporate information.102  
Since the impact of the repurchase decisions cannot be fully isolated from other 
forces influencing companies the results can be diluted and may not be 
universally applicable to every U.S. corporation. To further strengthen the thesis 
of that paper and prove the universal validity of the findings an empirical study 
surveying a large number of companies should be conducted. 
However by the investigation of three different companies the author feels 
comfortable to provide broad guidelines that set a frameset for future successful 
share repurchases that create long-term value for shareholders. 
 12. CASE!STUDIES!
The following three case studies each provide evidence for different factors of 
success for share repurchases. The first case study deals with flawed incentive 
compensation and the resulting agency cost caused by buyback decisions at 
International Business Machines. The second case about Weight Watchers 
International points out the importance of an independent board and warns of 
dangers associated to a majority shareholder when own shares are acquired. 
Finally the Berkshire Hathaway case study gives a textbook example of a 
successful share repurchase program. 
 12.1. INTERNATIONAL!BUSINESS!MACHINES!
This case study will pay special attention to how executive incentive 
compensation is affecting the buyback decision. Therefore executive 
compensation will be analyzed and its impact on share repurchases and the overall 
company performance will be illustrated. It will be exhibited how executive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 All historical share price information is gathered from Google, Google Finance (not specified). 
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compensation can present significant agency cost to shareholders by triggering 
questionable share repurchase decisions. 
 
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), founded in 1911 and based 
in Armonk, New York is a company providing information technology (IT) 
solutions. IBM provides solutions to establish an IT-infrastructure, offers products 
for data storage, cloud services, data analytics and software such as operating 
systems. Additionally IBM through its global finance business is active in 
financing activities. Since 2012 Virginia M. Rometty is IBM´s CEO and chairman 
of the board.103 
 
IBM has been a constant buyer of its own equity. In the early 90´s IBM had over 
2 billion shares outstanding104, since then through repurchases the company has 
reduced that count to 1,04 billion in the first quarter of 2014105. The chart below 
shows IBM´s number of outstanding shares from the year of 1996 to 2013. 
!
Figure 6: IBM Shares Outstanding 
 
IBM´s share price has performed very well during those years, beating the overall 
market by a wide margin. Figure 7 shows the performance of IBM shares in 
comparison to the returns of the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index (S&P500), 
which represents the fortune 500 listed companies in the U.S. from the beginning 
of 2009 to the end of 2013. IBM has outperformed the index in the period of 2009 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 IBM Corp., Annual Report 2013 (2014). 
104 Berman, D. K., The Wallstreet Journal., Does IBM Love or Hate Itself? (2014). 
105 IBM Corp., Annual Report 2013 (2014). 
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to 2012. After that in 2013 things changed and IBM shares were down 2,1%, in a 
year where the S&P500 gained 29,7%.106  
 
!
Figure 7: IBM vs. S&P500 5-Year 
 
To give a possible explanation of IBM´s 2013 share price decline compensation 
and share repurchases are analyzed in the following. As assumed earlier 
unfavorable management compensation can lead to bad buyback decisions when 
the performance indicators are tied to per share ratios. At IBM top tier executives 
that perform capital allocation decisions are compensated according to such 
ratios.107 Representative for IBM´s top tier executive compensation practices the 
CEO´s compensation for the FY2013 will be analyzed. 
 
CEO compensation at IBM is consisting of three parts, a base salary, an annual 
incentive and the award of performance share units (PSU). The base salary 
represents a fixed amount that is not tied to performance, the annual incentive and 
the award of PSUs though depends on certain performance indicators. 
Compensation in 2013 was comprised of an 11% base salary and 89% 
performance based PSUs. An annual incentive was not granted (figure 8).108 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 Vlastelica, R., Wall St. ends best year since 1990s with moderate gains (2013). 
107 IBM Proxy Statement (2014). 
108 IBM Proxy Statement (2014). 
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!
Figure 8: IBM 2013 CEO Compensation Components  
The annual incentive is tied to goals regarding operating net income, revenue 
growth and free-cash-flow targets over a one-year period. Specific targets are not 
disclosed, as this information could be viable for competitors. However the annual 
incentive is a relatively small part when compared to the longer-term performance 
share units.109 
By far the biggest compensation component is the award of PSUs. One PSU 
equals one IBM share, thus the value of a PSU alters with the share price. The 
amount of PSUs granted is determined by the achievement of certain goals 
elaborated by the board of directors. Those goals are measured over a three-year 
period. In year one the CEO is awarded with a specific number of PSUs and 
three-year targets are defined. At the end of that three-year period the 
performance is compared to the initially set targets and PSUs are converted into 
shares of IBM and can then be sold for cash. If the targets are exceeded the 
granted amount is revised upwards, in case the performance falls short of, the 
number of awarded PSUs is reduced. Since PSUs represent the major element of 
the compensation, the CEO is strongly incentivized to meet or exceed those 
targets to maximize own net worth.110 At IBM the performance targets are tied to 
EPS with an 80% weight and to Free-Cash-Flow (FCF) weighted 20%111, which 
makes increasing EPS the priority goal to achieve. That suggests that IBM´s 
resources are fully dedicated to the major target of increasing EPS.112  
 
Prior the impact of share repurchases on EPS was explained. EPS increase after a 
share buyback as the company´s net income is divided by a now lower number of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 IBM Proxy Statement (2014). 
110 IBM Proxy Statement (2014). 
111 FCF is comprised of the operating cash flow net the cash flow from investing 
112 IBM Proxy Statement (2014). 
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outstanding shares. Thus each share represents a bigger part of the earnings.113 
Since at IBM the CEO is compensated primarily on EPS targets a safe and easy 
way to meet or exceed this goal is to repurchase shares. 
The below cash flow statement for the last 10 years shows that share buybacks as 
an instrument to increase EPS have been used on a big scale. The net issuance of 
stock is defined as all the stock that has been issued minus the shares that have 
been repurchased. So the larger the negative number the more was spent on 
repurchases. That number so far was highest in FY11 where about net USD 15 
billion were spent on repurchases. During that time EPS rose from USD 4.38 in 
2004 to USD 14.94 in 2013. 
 
 
 !
Figure 9: IBM Cash Flow From Financing and Diluted EPS 10-Year 
 
However as the compensation incentive is primarily to increase EPS as much as 
possible over a relatively short three-year period the operating business has lately 
suffered. To be able to fund the repurchase and buy back as much shares as 
possible and to achieve a high FCF during the three-year periods, capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) have been cut and long-term debt has risen.  
 
CAPEX are expenditures to acquire assets that create future cash flows for the 
company. Usually a business needs CAPEX to grow both future revenues and 
earnings.114 However often the positive effects from CAPEX are not immediately 
reflecting in companies´ revenues and earnings, which can be a reason why 
CAPEX are sacrificed in order to repurchase shares that instantly increase EPS 
and raise PSU awards. In the below statement CAPEX are represented as 
“purchase of property, plant and equipment”. A high negative number indicates !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 Dobbs, R./ Rehm, W., Mc Kinsey & Company Member Edition, The value of share buybacks (2005). 
114 Gabler, Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon CAPEX (not specified). 
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high CAPEX. In the last 10 years though investments at IBM were scaled back. 
The reduction in CAPEX also helped to grow FCF by increasing the cash flow 
from investing, which was the second target PSU compensation based upon.  
 
Additionally to fund the share buybacks and increase EPS, long-term debt was 
used and therefore rose from USD 14,8 billion with a debt/total asset ratio of 0,13 
in FY2004 to USD 32,9 billion and a debt/total asset ratio of 0,26 at the end of 
FY2013 as seen below. 
 
 
 !
Figure 10:  IBM CAPEX and Long-Term Debt 10 Year 
 
As of late IBM´s revenues started to decline and the reduction in CAPEX in favor 
of share buybacks could give an explanation for that (see below chart). Revenues 
peaked in FY2012 and are in a decline ever since. In 2013 IBM´s share price 
followed that development, when it lost 2,1% when the S&P500 ended the year 
with strong gains.115 
 
!
Figure 11: IBM Revenue Quarter on Quarter  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 Vlastelica, R., Wall St. ends best year since 1990s with moderate gains (2013). 
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Despite IBM´s concerning negative revenue growth trend the CEO´s PSU 
compensation in 2013 grew to USD 11,7 million, as EPS targets were reached due 
to the large share repurchase program. 
That shows compensation based on short-term (three-year target period) EPS 
growth decouples the buyback decision from the creation of intrinsic value. A 
CEO compensated on EPS targets not only seeks to repurchase undervalued 
shares that increase intrinsic value, such compensation also incentivizes to 
repurchase overvalued shares as this is also lifting EPS. Repurchasing overvalued 
shares however destroys intrinsic value and harms shareholder value in the long-
term.  
 
!
Figure 12: 2013 IBM CEO Compensation 
 
In conclusion that case study made obvious that short-term executive 
compensation based on EPS can present large agency cost to the shareholders of a 
company. EPS are positively influenced by share repurchases. Compensation on 
EPS thus incentivizes to repurchase as many shares as possible, whether or not 
they are undervalued. Furthermore the short-term focus on increasing EPS harm 
the business in the long-term, as CAPEX is cut back which is needed to grow a 
company. Such compensation also encourages using debt to fund repurchases to 
further boost EPS. In a crisis, when earnings decline, this additional debt could 
drive a company into financial distress. 
 
Hence for a successful buyback it is essential to tie short-term compensation to 
numbers that cannot be influenced by share buybacks to prevent agency cost. 
However if EPS based compensation is wished for a particular reason, the 
repurchased shares should be taken out of the equation to calculate the EPS 
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relevant for the performance measurement. Another solution for a successful 
buyback despite of EPS based compensation is to equip equity compensation with 
long holding periods to be sure that executives do not sacrifice future growth by 
foregoing CAPEX for share repurchases to get an immediate EPS boost. 
 12.2. WEIGHT!WATCHERS!INTERNATIONAL!
Weight Watchers International Inc. is a New York based company providing 
weight management services. It is best known for its Weight Watchers branded 
point system that is supposed to help people lose weight. It also tries to support 
people losing weight through group meetings by offering food plans, instructions 
for exercising and healthy behavior. Instructors having lost weight themselves by 
attending Weight Watcher meetings run these meetings. Every week about 40.000 
people are attending 10.000 Weight Watchers meetings.116 
 
In 1999 H.J. Heinz sold Weight Watchers to Artal Group for USD 735 million in 
a leveraged buyout transaction (LBO).117 LBO´s are company deals financed by 
high amounts of debt, which are then paid down by the acquired company´s 
earnings. To reap a significant profit the company is then sold out to other 
investors.118 After its acquisition Artal Group brought Weight Watchers public in 
a 2001 initial public offering (IPO). It then has sold almost half of its Weight 
Watcher stake for a large profit and is as of today holding approximately 52% 
ownership in the company.119 
In 2012 Weight Watchers conducted a share buyback that will be examined in this 
case study. Particular interest will be paid to the agency cost related to a non-
independent board of directors and to a majority shareholder such as Artal in that 
case. 
 
Prior to the share buyback of 2012 Artal held a control stake in Weight Watchers 
of approximately 52%.120 According to Weight Watchers corporate governance 
statues and its ownership stake Artal controls the board of directors since Artal is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Weight Watchers Inc. Investor Relations: Company Overview (2013). 
117 Vardi, N., The Mystery Man Behind the Weight Watchers Deal (2012). 
118 Investopedia, Leveraged Buyout - LBO (not specified). 
119 Vardi, N., The Mystery Man Behind the Weight Watchers Deal (2012). 
120 Weight Watchers Inc. 10-K Annual Report 2012 (2013). 
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able to nominate a number of directors equal to their percentage of ownership, 
giving them the ability to compose the board in their favor (see below figure).121 
 
!
Figure 13: Weight Watchers Board of Directors Artal Nominees 
 
Since Artal holds the majority of voting shares they are able to approve the 
nominated directors in a vote, which gives Artal full control over manager 
compensation and incentives. The below excerpt of the corporate governance 
guidelines that lines out the functions of the board of Weight Watchers proves 
that.  
 
!
Figure 14: Weight Watchers Board of Directors and CEO Compensation !
The Weight Watchers board constituent of the Artal nominees has granted stock 
options to its CEO David Kirchhoff in the years of 2005 and 2006 as an incentive. 
The total amount of options granted during those years accounted for 187.500 
Weight Watchers shares.122 Artal hereby aligned its own and the CEO´s interests. 
In the following both parties would profit from a rising share price. !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 Weight Watchers Inc. Corporate Governance Guidelines (2014). 
122 Weight Watchers Inc. Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities (2012). 
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Figure 15: Weight Watchers Board of Directors Composition 
 
Weight Watchers steadily increased its revenues from USD 1.412 billion in fiscal 
year (FY) 2009 to USD 1.839 billion in FY 2012. Net income however peaked at 
the end of FY 2011 with Weight Watchers earning USD 304,9 million and 
significantly decreased in the following years. Revenues also followed the decline 
in FY 2013, as seen in the excerpt below. 
 
!
Figure 16: Weight Watchers Key Numbers 2009-2013 
 
The growth in revenues and net income was accompanied by a large increase in 
share price, which rose from below USD 20 in 2009 to above USD 80 in 2011. In 
2012 after it became obvious for investors that net income and revenues would 
decrease in the following years the share price steadily declined marking a low of 
USD 19.50 at the beginning of this year. 
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Figure 17: Weight Watchers Share Price 5 Year 
 
As common in LBO transactions the investor (Artal) wants to cash out at the 
highest price possible. The management equipped with stock options also profits 
from high share prices. This is why in 2012 the board, controlled by Artal 
directors, approved a Dutch auction tender offer to repurchase shares near its all 
time highs; even shares were significantly overvalued as the current share price 
(approx. USD 20) indicates. 
 
 
!
Figure 18: Weight Watchers Share Repurchase Conditions 
 
In 2012 on February 23rd Weight Watchers initiated what they called a “modified 
Dutch auction” and asked shareholders to determine a share price upon which 
they would agree to sell shares worth USD 720 million to the company. A very 
high range was set up by the board, to Artal´s benefit, of USD 72 per share up to 
USD 83 per share. The auction resulted in an USD 82 price for each share 
tendered to Weight Watchers. Prior to the announcement of the buyback Artal as a 
majority shareholder agreed not to participate in the auction and the tender offer 
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because they did not want to influence the purchase price. Simultaneously 
however, the Weight Watchers board agreed to acquire for the same price 
determined in the tender offer (USD 82 per share) as much shares from Artal that 
they would hold an equal ownership stake in Weight Watchers as prior to the 
tender offer, as figure 18 indicates. 
 
Consequently Weight Watchers had to buy back 8.8 million shares for USD 82 
each from shareholders other than Artal for a total of about USD 720 Mio. 
 !"#$"%!!""#$ = 8.8! "##"$% ∗ $82 = $721,6! "##"$% 
 
And since they agreed on purchasing as much Artal shares as needed to keep 
Artal´s stake in the company at 52%, Weight Watchers had to acquire another 9.5 
million shares for USD 82 each costing the company USD 779 million. 
 !"#$%!!""#$ = 9.5! "##"$% ∗ $82 = $779! "##"$% 
 
The total cost for the repurchase therefore is USD 1.500,6 million. Cash and 
equivalents on the balance sheet that could be used to fund the buyback accounted 
for USD 47,47 million and 2011 free-cash-flow (FCF) was at USD 356,68 
million. Together they equaled only USD 404,15 million, by far not sufficient to 
cover the total repurchase cost of USD 1,5 billion. Hence Weight Watchers had to 
take on debt to be able to finance the buyback, which the Artal controlled board 
also acknowledged (figures 19,20). 
 !"! = !"#$%&'()!!"#ℎ!"#$ + !"#ℎ!!"#$!!"#$!!"#$#%"#&!!"#$%$#$&' 2011!!"! = $401,89! "##"$% − $45,21! "##"$% = $!"#,!"! "##"$% 
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!
Figure 19: Weight Watchers Cash and Equivalents !
 
Figure 20: Weight Watchers Cash Flow Statement 
 
At the beginning of 2012, approved by the board of directors, Weight Watchers 
therefore took on USD 1.449 million of debt to acquire stock form Artal and other 
Shareholders that participated in the tender offer for a total of USD 1.504 million 
(figure 21). 
 
 
!
Figure 21: Weight Watchers Debt Issuance and Share Repurchase 
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According to the SEC 10k filing of 2012 the two buybacks were conducted March 
28th and April 29th of 2012123. By that time Weight Watchers revenue growth has 
already stalled and net income decreased 25% from 1st quarter 2011 on higher 
marketing and SG&A (Sales, general and administrative) expenses according to 
the SEC 10q filing of the 1st quarter of 2012. By that time a board that is not 
controlled by a majority shareholder could have questioned this debt funded 
buyback at that elevated price of USD 82 per share. To justify a share price of 
USD 82 growth was necessary. The share price chart showed earlier above 
provides a very good picture of the overvaluation. With the release of the 1st 
quarter results of 2012 on 10th of May 2012 the share price started its downward 
movement and in the following went down to USD 20 a share.  
 
!
Figure 22: Weight Watchers Income Statement Q1 2012 
 
But not only Artal and other share holders that sold their shares to the repurchase 
program profited. Also Weight Watchers CEO David Kirchhoff used the self-
created opportunity to exercise a part of his stock options that were granted to him 
as part of an incentive contract and sold the acquired shares on March 16th 2012. 
The form below filed with SEC shows the CEO´s trades. Stock options to acquire 
a total of 80.275 shares were exercised, and disposed for USD 80,68 and 
respectively USD 81,28 a share. With the cost to acquire those shares of USD !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Weight Watchers Inc., 10-K Annual Report 2011 (2012). 
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42,08 to USD 53,03 the CEO made a large profit from those transactions (figure 
23). 
 
!
Figure 23: Weight Watchers CEO-dealings 
 
The previous findings clearly show that Artal and its executives profited largely 
from the share buyback at overvalued prices by selling equity holdings. The 
equity compensation granted to the CEO by the Artal controlled board of directors 
incentivized to drive up the share price by buying back, overvalued stock. 
 
However there are shareholders other than Artal that continued to hold on to their 
shares in Weight Watchers. Those shareholders, until the beginning of April 2014, 
lost about 80% on their stock if they had bought into the company when the 
repurchase was conducted. Instead of a positive return due to the repurchase that 
usually signals an undervaluation they would have lost almost their entire 
investment and now hold shares of a highly levered company with negative 
equity. Earnings and revenues further decreased in 2013 and showed no sign of 
returning to growth so far. Reaching share prices north of USD 82 in the future 
seems very unlikely. 
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Figure 24: Weight Watchers Balance Sheet After the Buyback 
 
Summarized continuing shareholders that did not participate in the repurchase had 
to pay for Artal´s and the executives´ profit. The share repurchase destroyed a lot 
of value as each Weight Watchers share is now worth significantly less than prior 
to the buyback. 
Major shareholders at first glance seem like a good thing as they can strongly 
represent shareholder´s interest in the board of the company. But if there is a 
majority shareholder that fully controls the board, which is in significant conflict 
of interests with the other shareholders, such as Artal, can bear large agency costs 
for the minority shareholders. The conflict of interests at Weight Watchers was 
based and still bases on the fact that Artal has short term profit interest in Weight 
Watchers. They want to cash out as quickly and at a high as possible share price, 
whereas other shareholders are likely to have long-term interest in the company.  
 
But not only a majority shareholder that is in control of the board poses a threat of 
large agency cost in association with share repurchases, also a board with a 
majority of non-independent directors nominated contains that risk. If that is the 
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case and the board is controlled by a high number of executive directors, that are 
both manager and director, the company is very likely to pursue interests of the 
executives. For the buyback decision that implies buybacks wouldn´t be used as 
an instrument to increase long-term value for the continuing shareholder but to 
raise compensation of executives.  
Hence for successful buybacks an independent board that has committed itself to 
the goal of increasing long-term shareholder value is essential. 
 12.3. BERKSHIRE!HATHAWAY!
The previous case studies suggested that a non-independent board and incentive 
compensation based on per share ratios such as EPS is contradictory to a 
successful share buyback. 
Berkshire Hathaway, a holding company, makes a good example of how to 
extract long-term value for shareholders by buying back stock. 
 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is an Omaha, Nebraska based holding company. The 
firm holds subsidiaries active in various industries. These include insurance and 
reinsurance, transportation, energy utilities, financial, manufacturing and services 
and retail businesses. The managers of the Berkshire Hathaway subsidiaries make 
operating decisions for the companies they are running. Investment decisions and 
decisions on capital allocation for Berkshire Hathaway and its subsidiaries are 
made by or after consultation with CEO and chairman of the board and Warren E. 
Buffett and Vice Chairman of the board Charles T. Munger.124 
 
Buffett as of July 5th 2013 owns 336.000 common Class A, and 1.567.907 
common Class B shares in Berkshire Hathaway giving him a voting power of 
34,08% and a 20,5% economic interest in the company (figure 25). Those values 
differ as class B shares have inferior voting power when compared to the class A 
share (1 class B shares represents 1/1.500th class A share, but 1 class B shares 
only has 1/10.000th of the voting rights of a class A share)125. Buffett as the CEO 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report 2013 (2014). 
125 Buffett, W. E., Berkshire Class A and Class B Stock (1999). 
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of the company holds that many shares, as he was the founder of the partnership 
that was Berkshire Hathaway Inc.´s predecessor.126 
The market capitalization (CAP) of Berkshire Hathaway, which is shares 
outstanding times share price, is about USD 300 billion as of April 10th 2014. 
 !"# = !ℎ!"#$! "#$#%&'(&) ∗ !ℎ!"#!!"#$% !"# = 1.643.613!(!"#$$!!) ∗ $183.212 = $301,13!!"##"$% 
 
According to the current share price of USD 183.212 (Class A) and USD 122,29 
(Class B) as of April 15th 2014 the CEO´s personal holdings equal USD 61,75 
billion. 
 !"#$%&'(! "#$%&'(!!"# = 336.000 ∗ $183.212+ 1.567! "##"$% ∗ $122,29= $61,75!!"##"$%! 
  
Unlike with the Weight Watchers case this very large holding does not represent a 
majority of voting rights (34,08%) and hence prevents the board of directors from 
being controlled by a single large shareholder. 
 
!
Figure 25: Berkshire Hathaway, Mr. Buffett Personal Holdings 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Livy, J., Warren Buffett: a short biography (2013). 
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Berkshires´ board of directors consists of 12 members of which 8 are independent 
(Figure 26). Therefore Berkshire Hathaway’s board, which is approved by 
shareholder vote, can be trusted to defend the interests of shareholders in the 
decision making process. 
 
!
Figure 26: Berkshire Hathaway Board of Directors Composition 
 
Both the large equity holding in the company by the CEO and Chairman and the 
independent board of directors provide an optimal frameset for the generation of 
long-term shareholder value. 
On the one hand the equity stake of the CEO is not large enough for him to be 
able to take over full control of the board and on the other hand the stake is too 
big to realize short-term profits by selling out a significant part of the holdings on 
the market. That is the case because selling out a large part of the holding would 
drive down the share price sharply as there would be an excess of supply of shares 
that would not find a buyer. The inability to quickly take profit from short-term 
share price appreciation provides the optimal incentive contract for a CEO to deal 
in the interest of shareholders. Any action that is harming intrinsic value in the 
long-term also negatively impacts the CEO´s net worth. 
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Prior to 2011 Berkshire Hathaway has never made a commitment repurchase its 
own stock. Therefore Berkshire Hathaway according to CEO Buffett has ceased 
some chances to increase the company´s per share intrinsic value by repurchasing 
shares. In September 2011 that changed. Berkshire Hathaway announced its first 
share repurchase program. The company approved to repurchase own stock every 
time the share price would fall below 110% of book value. It was announced that 
the repurchase would stop should cash reserves fall below USD 20 billion.127  
 
It was explicated earlier that only repurchases of shares below intrinsic value 
increase intrinsic value per share. As an insider with all of the company´s 
information at hand the CEO explained that when shares are traded below that 
110% threshold they are priced at a large discount to a conservatively calculated 
intrinsic value. Thus below or at that price share repurchases significantly benefit 
shareholders long-term.128 The chart below is strengthening that thesis. The 
average price-to-book value from 1999 to 2012 indicated by the red line in the 
below chart suggests that the company is fair intrinsic value is at about 1.5 times 
book value. So a share price, which is 110% of book value, represents a 
meaningful discount to intrinsic value and a favorable repurchasing price. 
 
!
Figure 27: Berkshire Hathaway Price-to-Book Value 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2011 (2012). 
128 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2011 (2012). 
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Following to the buyback announcement the company was able to repurchase 
stock worth USD 67 million before the share price went back above the 110% 
book value threshold, which would equal about 670 class A shares assumed an 
average price of USD 100.000.129 However 670 shares less outstanding hardly 
increase intrinsic value of the business. Furthermore the repurchase effect was 
offset by the issuance of shares worth USD 355 million.  
 
This is also the reason why at the end of 2012 the threshold for repurchasing 
shares was lowered to 120% book value. At 1.2 times book value per share the 
Berkshire management still saw shares undervalued.130 Given the average share 
price was about at 1.5 price-to-book from the years of 1999 to 2012 that seems 
credible. Following to that announcement the company could repurchase shares 
for USD 1.296 million below the threshold of 1.2 times book value per share as 
seen in the statement of changes in equity below. 
 
!
Figure 28: Berkshire Hathaway Statements of Changes in Shareholders´ Equity 
 
The USD 1.296 million reduced the company´s share count by a total of 9.879 
class A shares131. After the repurchase, as seen in the statement of changes in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2011 (2012). 
130 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2012 (2013). 
131 606.499 Class B shares were repurchased, which equal 404 Class A shares are factored into the number 
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equity the company wasn´t able to repurchase any shares below its threshold in 
FY 2013 as its share price advanced well above that level132.  
The diagram below illustrates the whole buyback program starting in December 
2011 until today. Shares were bought back whenever the blue share price line 
crossed below the red threshold line (red marks). The green line shows the book 
value per share. After December 2012 the 120% book value level has never been 
crossed hence no additional repurchases were executed.  
 
!
Figure 29: Berkshire Hathaway Repurchase Threshold 
 
Setting a threshold above which shares cannot be repurchased not only prevents 
from overpaying for shares and destroying intrinsic value it is also an effective 
signal to markets. The commitment to repurchase shares below that threshold 
communicates a minimum value that the executives think the company is worth. 
Consequently short after the repurchase announcements in 2011 and late 2012 the 
share price pushed higher. Markets highly valued the signaling of the company as 
the CEO who decided on the buyback and the threshold has significant interest in 
buying undervalued shares because of his large personal equity stake. 
In the following an estimate of the approximate impact that the share repurchase 
of late 2012 has had on the intrinsic value of the company will be given. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report 2013 (2014). 
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calculation is based on the assumption that intrinsic or fair value of the company 
is at 1.4 times the company´s book value. This is below the average price of 1.5 
times book value from 1999-2012 and thus a conservative number. The annual 
report of 2013 shows that 9879 class A shares worth USD 1.296 million have 
been repurchased in 2012.133 That makes an average repurchase price of 131.187 
per class A share. 
 !"#$%&#!!"#$%&ℎ!"#!!"#$% = $1.296! "##"$%! !9879 = 131.187 
 
As the repurchase occurred in December 2012, the book value by end of FY2012 
plus the amount spent on the repurchase will be used to calculate the estimated 
intrinsic value prior to the buyback. This has to be done as repurchases reduce 
shareholders equity and consequently reduce book value. Book value at the end of 
FY2012 was USD 191.588 million, after adding back the USD 1.296 million for 
repurchases the adjusted book value is USD 192.884 million. In per share 
numbers that equals USD 116.807 per share calculated with an average of 
1.651.294 Class A shares outstanding in FY2012. 1.651.294 will also be used as 
the number of shares outstanding before the buyback. However the number 
should be slightly higher as the average outstanding share count of FY2012 
includes one month with the reduced shares outstanding after the buyback.134 
 
The company´s estimated intrinsic value conservatively calculated is USD 
270.037 million. 
 !"#$%"&%'!!"#$% = !" ∗ 1,4 !"#$%"&%'!!"#$% = $192.884! "##"$% ∗ 1,4 = $270.037! 
 
After the repurchase intrinsic value decreases as USD 1.296 million were spent on 
the buyback. However as low yielding cash was used to fund the buyback the 
interest payments that are foregone do not significantly reduce the businesses 
intrinsic value.135 Nevertheless to be on the conservative side the present value of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report 2013 (2014). 
134 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report 2013 (2014). 
135 Buffett, W. E., Letter to Shareholders 2011 (2012). 
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the cash spent on the buyback will be subtracted of the intrinsic value. To estimate 
the present value a yield on the funds of 2% and WACC are 10% assumed. 
Berkshire Hathaway´s intrinsic value after the buyback therefore is $269.713 
million. 
.  !"!!"#ℎ = !$1.296! "##"$% ∗ 0,020,1− 0,02 = $324! "##"$% 
 !"#$%"&%'!!"#$%!!"#$% = $270.037! "##"$%!− $324! "##"$%!= $269.713! "##"$% 
 
To arrive at the number of outstanding shares after the buyback the ante buyback 
share count has to be reduced by 9879. That makes 1.641.415 post buyback shares 
outstanding and is almost in line with the numbers from the annual report.  
 
USD  Before Buyback After Buyback 
Intrinsic Value  (1,4 BV)   270.037 million 269.713 million 
Shares Outstanding 1.651.294 1.641.415 
Intrinsic Value / Share 163.531 164.317 
Repurchase Price  131.187  
Shares Repurchased 9.879  
Table 11: Berkshire Hathaway Intrinsic Value per Share !
Computed on a conservative basis the repurchase increased the intrinsic value per 
share from USD 163.531 to USD 164.317. As of April 2014 the share price has 
significantly surpassed that level and is now trading at USD 185.640 a share 
(16.04.14), which is another increase that shares have been acquired below 
intrinsic value. 
 
Summarizing the findings of the Berkshire Hathaway buyback several success 
factors for share buybacks can be derived. It is beneficial for the buyback decision 
when the CEO and other executives have a major exposure to the equity of the 
company. A large position helps to focus the executives on long-term value 
creation instead of short-term self-dealing, as holdings cannot be cashed out 
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quickly. An alternative to a very large direct stake in the equity would be the 
award of RSUs or ESOs equipped with selling restrictions of several years (more 
than 5), which would also incentivize managers to pursue repurchases that 
increase the firms´ intrinsic value and consequently increase the share price. 
Another finding is that the holders of the large equity stake should not have total 
control of the board. Berkshire Hathaway has a mostly independent board of 
directors, which can assess the management decisions in favor of all shareholders. 
Such a board can compensate the management adequately in order to pursue long-
term value creation (e.g. awarding RSUs or ESOs with long holding periods) or it 
can hinder the management from proceeding with repurchases of overvalued stock 
and other value destroying activities. 
Beneficial and very helpful for the repurchase decision is the determination of a 
threshold above which shares cannot be repurchased anymore. The management 
should have a clear opinion on what its company is worth. It therefore should tie 
the repurchase decision closely to an appropriate ratio that best reflects the value 
of the business. Price-to-book is a telling ratio for holding companies, other 
companies would fare better with different ratios such as P/E. Anytime the ratio 
threshold is undercut shares should be repurchased. By that the management 
would make sure that every time shares are repurchased intrinsic value is 
increased. Such a repurchase tied to a threshold is also an effective signal to 
markets as it sets a floor to the share price. The firm communicates it is worth at 
least the amount at which it starts repurchasing shares. Executives holding large 
equity positions enhance the strength of that signal, as they would suffer along 
with other shareholders from bad buyback decisions.  
 13. RESULTS!AND!CONCLUSIONS!
The three case studies strengthen the significance of the elaborated factors of 
success for share repurchases.  
This paper developed several main drivers for successful share repurchases. 
Critical is an independent board that freely determines management compensation 
and monitors behavior, executive compensation has to incentivize long-term value 
creation and should not be increasable by share repurchases. Additionally a 
majority shareholder that has differing interests from the other owners of a 
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company hinders the successful execution of share repurchases. Ultimately to 
further prevent an acquisition of overvalued stock setting thresholds, tied to ratios 
reflecting the company value, above which shares do not qualify for a repurchase 
benefits the buyback decision and effectively communicates a minimum company 
value to the markets. 
 
The findings of this paper provide strong evidence whether or not future share 
repurchase programs create long-term value for shareholders. Assuming a 
company, which initiates a share repurchase, respects all of the above success 
factors chances are high that shareholder value increases in the long-term. 
However if none of those factors prevail at company that buys back its equity, 
long-term shareholders should be aware of the high risk of an unfavorable 
outcome and are advised to critically question the repurchase decision.
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